

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

October 18, 2013

**TO:** S. A. Stokes, Acting Technical Director  
**FROM:** D. Gutowski and R. Quirk, Hanford Site Representatives  
**SUBJECT:** Hanford Activity Report for the Week Ending October 18, 2013

**Preparations for Site Shutdown.** Due to a lapse in Fiscal Year 2014 appropriations, the Richland Operations Office (RL) and the Office of River Protection directed their contractors to prepare for an orderly ramp-down to minimum operations. The contractors provided shutdown plans to the site offices this week and began ramp-down activities. Key items in the shutdown plans involving nuclear facilities included:

- The RL contractors must comply with TSR minimum staffing and surveillance requirements as well as all RCRA and State permits for air and waste water permits. Other work, such as D&D activities at the Plutonium Finishing Plant, was to be placed in a safe configuration.
- The tank farms contractor would halt all retrieval and projects work with the exception of completion of a few days of C-110 operational work. Operations would shrink down to one maintenance and operations team as well as personnel to perform required surveillances.

With the approval of continued funding late this week, the shutdown plans were not fully implemented.

**Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP).** Two workers found an object resembling a small battery on the floor in a PFP radiological controls office. They handled it, could not determine what it was, and left it on a desk. The next day another worker noted the radioactive trefoil symbol on the object. Subsequently, the contractor determined that the object was a strontium-90 sealed source capsule that had fallen from its holder. An initial check of the involved workers' dosimetry indicated no unusual exposure. Contamination surveys of areas contacted by the source identified no contamination. A further assessment of extremity doses is planned.

**Sludge Treatment Project.** DOE's Independent Project Review (IPR) team issued their report on the project's Critical Decision (CD) -2/3 completion and noted two areas of concern, one area for improvement, and four significant strengths. The results of the review support approval of the CD-2/3 package once the areas of concern are resolved to RL's satisfaction. One of the two concerns is that the Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis (PDSA) was not finalized before CD-2/3. RL has agreed to a path forward to resolve all their comments on the PDSA and the project expects to submit the revised PDSA to RL in the near future.

**Tank Farms.** The contractor has been performing work supporting the replacement of the failed slurry pump in single-shell tank C-107 (see Activity Report 7/19/2013). There was a lockout/tagout technical error during performance of this work. Two individuals entered the authorized worker area without installing personal locking devices. The contractor approved the work package to install the new slurry pump which is planned for next week. Replacing the pump will be a high radiological risk activity with significant industrial safety aspects.

**Waste Treatment Plant (WTP).** The site rep observed a training session on the contractor's control selection process. The training included an examination at its conclusion and provided an adequate overview of the contractor's procedure and handbook for control selection.